reserve for mobilization
Mobilzation reserve, forecast
The analysis “forecast, mobilization reserve for AFU” was made based on the results of a social survey and mathematical modeling. The social survey was conducted by the recruitment agency Lobby X. Among the interactive parameters, it is possible to select gender, age, and place of residence. In turn, the result of mathematical modeling from Texty.org is the number of men of mobilization age who do not have any legal reasons to avoid military service, such as deferment, education, residence abroad, etc. Therefore, in order to correlate the survey and the mathematical model, we selected the following filters for the social survey: men, 25-54 years old, residing in Ukraine.
The forecast was formed as follows:
1) determining the willingness to serve in general and in a combat position,
2) determining the general reasons for unwillingness to serve,
3) determining the specific reasons in the main direction,
4) mathematical modeling of the total number of men of draft age,
5) projection of the obtained percentages on the result of mathematical modeling.
Readiness to serve: overall in the army and in combat positions
What percentage are generally willing to serve in the army?
Stage 1, Part 1. Results of responses to the question: “Are you theoretically ready to join the army?” A total of 20,760 questionnaires.
Please note that under current conditions of service (i.e., without changes or reforms), only 23% of respondents are willing to serve.
What percentage are willing to serve in a combat role?
Stage 1, part 2.
Only those who had previously expressed their willingness to join the army answered the following question: 3% said yes, I am already working on it; 4% said yes, I plan to do so soon; 16% said yes, I will receive a draft notice; and 24% said yes, under certain conditions. This amounts to a total of 47% of all respondents.
Stage 1, Part 2. Results of responses to the question: “Are you theoretically prepared to serve in a combat position?”
A total of 4,922 questionnaires.
Please note that more than half of respondents also consider a combat position.
General reasons for unwillingness to serve
We single out those who are not yet ready to serve or are ready under certain conditions.
The second stage was to determine the main requirements and changes needed. Those who had previously responded that they were willing to join the army answered the following questions: 24% were willing, but under certain conditions; 17% were not willing at all; 21% considered civilian activities to be more useful; 6% believed that they would not be useful in the army. This amounts to a total of 68% of respondents.
Let's find out the request for the general direction of change
Stage 2. Results of responses to the question: “What conditions could influence your decision to join the Armed Forces?” A total of 13,912 questionnaires were completed.
48% reform and modernization of the army
42% government reform
40% confidence that service will be useful for victory
28% loss of usefulness for victory from civilian activities
27% significant increase in support from allies
22% nothing will have an impact
19% significant increase in military pay
13% entry of allied troops into the war
8% other
5% major victories by the AFU and liberation of territories
Importantly, the demand for reform and modernization of the army significantly exceeded the demand for increased financial support.
Let's specify the request for reforms in the army
We identify a list of reasons in the main direction of change
The third stage is to specify the request for reforms in the army as the main direction of change. Results of responses to the question: “What changes in the army, in your opinion, could positively influence people’s readiness and willingness to join the Armed Forces?”
A total of 29,786 questionnaires were completed. Responses from all respondents.
63% mechanism for dismissing incompetent commanders,
58% high-quality training for recruits,
58% opportunity to choose a position and unit,
56% adequate rest and rotation,
53% acquisition of technologies to counter KABs, aviation, etc.,
53% guaranteed service in the chosen position,
51% fixed term of service,
46% high-quality training of commanders,
46% modernization of approaches to decision-making on operations,
38% career growth for those who prioritize saving the lives of personnel,
34% provision of a transfer mechanism,
34% increase in military pay,
24% optimization of the general staff,
5% other
It is important to note that requests for rotations and terms of service are among the top seven, almost equal to requests for commander competence, choice of position, and training, and significantly exceed requests for financial support.
Reserve for mobiblization, mathematical modeling
Let's find out the initial data for mathematical modeling
In the fourth stage, the total number of men and the number in each category of the population that has no legal grounds to avoid mobilization are first determined, and then a mathematical model is created based on this initial data. Thus, from the total number of the mobilization reserve of men aged 18-59, we subtract those categories that are not subject to mobilization. For example, students, reservists, caregivers, fugitives abroad, military personnel, etc.
Mathematical modeling of the mobilization reserve
There are mathematical modeling methods that allow us to calculate the approximate labor reserve, even based on unreliable data. (Unreliable data includes the number of reservations, students, runaways, etc.) Using this method, we can work with approximate ranges.
For example, the total number of men is estimated at 9–11 million, and 300–600 thousand men of draft age have left the country. Such ranges are sufficient to estimate the available mobilization reserve. The result will not be an exact figure, but a distribution of probabilities.
*The Squiggle model simulates the situation many times (say, 1,000), comparing all the vague data from different categories, and each time it gets different values and shows the distribution of all the values that occurred.
The result of the simulation is a curve on the graph that shows:
It is very unlikely that the mob reserve will be less than 2.8 million (5%).
It is very unlikely that the mob reserve will exceed 4.9 million (95%).
Mean (3.9 million) — the average value; if we take a lot of different input data, they will give this figure on average.
50% (3.8 million) — the median, i.e., half of the possible values are less than 3.8 million, and half are greater.
5% (2.8 million) and 95% (4.9 million) are the limits of the confidence interval.
This means that in 90% of cases, the actual value is between 2.8 and 4.9 million.
Forecast of a “second wave of volunteers” among the mobilization reserve
Projection of survey results onto modeling results
Stage five. Forecast of the number of men of military age who are ready to join the army in the event of reforms in the military. Or a reserve for the mobilization of a “second wave of volunteers,” which is possible provided that key reforms are carried out in the military, for which there is demand according to the survey.
Let’s take the lowest estimate of the total number of reserves: 2.8 million.
— According to the survey, 68% of them (1.904 million) are willing to join the army under certain conditions.
— Of these, 48% (of 1.904 million), or 914,000, are ready to join the army on the condition of reforms in the army, the key ones being: competence of commanders, training, choice of position, rotation, and fixed term of service.
— Among those who are ready to join the army, more than half are considering service in a combat position. If we project this distribution among those who are ready onto those who are waiting for reforms in the army first, it turns out that 475,000, or 52% of 914,000, are ready to serve in a combat position. This is the number of potential “second wave volunteers.”
We remind you that the total number of Defense Forces is 880,000-1 million people (according to various sources), which is almost equal to the number of men of draft age—914,000—who are ready to serve under the conditions of army reform. Let us assume that 108,000 military personnel serve mainly in combat positions and, according to the General Staff, will have to be dismissed if the draft law “On Military Service, Mobilization, and Military Registration” is adopted. This means that the number of people ready to serve in combat positions (475,000) is almost 4.4 times higher than the projected number (108,000).
NB from the NGO “Intention.” When society does not speak about its demands as publicly as possible, the authorities delay reforms and demands. And the longer the authorities delay reforms in the army, the longer Ukraine and society will be deprived of a “second wave of volunteers” that could completely replace the exhausted personnel.
